Abstract. Every definite logic program has as its meaning a least Herbrand model with respect to the program-independent ordering ⊆. In the case of normal logic programs there do not exist least models in general. However, according to a recent approach by Rondogiannis and Wadge, who consider infinite-valued models, every normal logic program does have a least model with respect to a program-independent ordering. We show that this approach can be extended to formula-based logic programs (i.e., finite sets of rules of the form A ← φ where A is an atom and φ an arbitrary first-order formula). We construct for a given program P an interpretation MP and show that it is the least of all models of P .
Introduction
It is well-known that every definite logic program P has a Herbrand model and the intersection of all its Herbrand models is also a model of P . We call it the least Herbrand model or the canonical model of P and constitute that it is the intended meaning of the program. If we consider a normal logic program P it is more complicated to state the intended meaning of the program because the intersection of all its models is not necessarily a model. There are many approaches to overcome that problem. The existing approaches are not purely model-theoretic (i.e., there are normal logic programs that have the same models but different intended meanings). However, there is a recent purely model-theoretic approach of P. Rondogiannis and W. Wadge [3] . They prove that every normal logic program has a least infinite-valued model. Their work is based on an infinite set of truth values, ordered as follows: F 0 < F 1 < ... < F α < ... < 0 < ... < T α < ... < T 1 < T 0
Intuitively, F 0 and T 0 are the classical truth values False and True, 0 is the truth value Undefined and α is an arbitrary countable ordinal. The considered ordering of the interpretations is a program-independent ordering on the infinite-valued interpretations and generalizes the classical ordering on the Herbrand interpretations. The intended meaning of a normal logic program is, as in the classical case, stated as the unique minimal infinite-valued model of P . Furthermore, they show that the 3-valued interpretation that results from the least infinite-valued model of P by collapsing all true values to True and all false values to False coincides with the well-founded model of P introduced in [2] . Inspired by [4] we consider in this paper formula-based logic programs. A formula-based logic program is a finite set of rules of the form A ← φ, where A is an atomic formula and φ is an arbitrary first-order formula. We show that the construction methods to obtain the least infinitevalued model of a normal logic program P given in [3] can be adapted to formula-based logic programs. The initial step to carry out this adaption is the proof of two extension theorems.
Informally speaking, these theorems state that a complex formula shows the same behavior as an atomic formula. While Rondogiannis and Wadge [3] make use of the fact that the bodies of normal program rules are conjunctions of negative or positive atoms, we instead make use of one of the extension theorems. The second step to achieve the adaption is the set-theoretical fact that the least uncountable cardinal ℵ 1 is regular (i.e., the limit of a countable sequence of countable ordinals is in ℵ 1 ). Contrary to the bodies of normal program rules, the bodies of formula-based program rules can refer a ground atom to a countably infinite set of ground atoms. This is the reason why we must use in our approach ℵ 1 many iteration steps in the construction of the least model of a given program P in conjunction with the regularity of ℵ 1 . In [3] ω many iteration steps in conjunction with the fact that the limit of a finite sequence of natural numbers is once again a natural number is sufficient to construct the least model. Towards the end of the paper, we use again the regularity of ℵ 1 to show that there is a countable ordinal δ max with the property that every least model of a formula-based logic-program refers only to truth values of the form T α or F α or 0, where α < δ max . This implies that we only need a very small fragment of the truth values if we consider the meaning of a formula-based logic program. Finally, we show that the 3-valued interpretation that results from the least infinite-valued model of a given formula-based logic program by collapsing all true values to True and all false values to False, is a model of P in the sense of [2] . But compared to the case of normal logic programs, the collapsed least infinite-valued model of a formula-based logic program is not a minimal 3-valued model of P in general. However, there is a simple restriction for the class of formula-based programs such that the collapsed model is minimal in general. At this point we would like to mention that we did not develop the theory presented in this paper with respect to applied logic. We have a predominantly theoretical interest in extending the notion of inductive definition to a wider class of rules. We make heavy use of ordinal numbers in this paper. Therefore, we included an appendix with a short introduction to ordinal numbers for those readers who are not familiar with this part of set theory. Moreover, one can find the omitted proofs and a detailed discussion of an example within the appendix. It is downloadable at: http://www-ls.informatik.uni-tuebingen.de/luedecke/luedecke.html Remark 1. To motivate these definitions let us briefly recall the classical 2-valued situation. Therefore let us pick two (2-valued) Herbrand interpretations I, J ⊆ H B . Considering these, it becomes apparent that I ⊆ J holds if and only if the set of ground atoms that are false w.r.t. J is a subset of the set of ground atoms that are false w.r.t. I and the set of ground atoms that are true w.r.t. I is a subset of the set of ground atoms that are true w.r.t. J. Definition 14. Let h be a variable assignment. The semantics of terms is given by (with respect to h):
Before we start to talk about the semantics of formulas, we have to show that every subset of W has a least upper bound (abbr: sup) and a greatest lower bound (abbr: inf). The proof of the following lemma is left to the reader. The proof is using the fact that every nonempty subset of ℵ 1 has a least element.
Lemma 1. For every subset M ⊆ W the least upper bound sup M and the greatest lower bound
Definition 15. Let I be an interpretation and h be a variable assignment. The semantics of formulas is given by (with respect to I and h):
. Additionally, the semantics of ⊤ and ⊥ is given by ⊤ 
Definition 16. Let A ← φ be a rule, P a program and I an interpretation. Then I satisfies A ← φ if for all variable assignment h the property A I h ≥ φ I h holds. Furthermore, I is a model of P if I satisfies all rules of P .
Definition 17. Let A ← φ be a rule and σ be a variable substitution (i.e., a function from Var to Term with finite support). Then, Aσ ← φσ is a ground instance of the rule A ← φ if Aσ ∈ H B and all variables in φσ are in the scope of a quantifier. It is easy to see that that Aσ (with respect to an interpretation I and a variable assignment h) depend only on I. That is why we write also Aσ I and φσ I . We denote the set of all ground instances of a program P with P G . Example 1. Consider the formula-based program P given by the set of rules {P (c) ←, R(x) ← ¬P (x), P (Sx) ← ¬R(x), Q ← ∀x (P (x))}. Then it is easy to prove that the Herbrand interpretation I = {P (S n c) → T 2n ; n ∈ N} ∪ {R(S n c) → F 2n+1 ; n ∈ N} ∪ {Q → T ω } is a model of P . Moreover, using the results of this paper one can show that it is also the least Herbrand model of P .
Remark 2.
Before we proceed we want to give a short informal but intuitive description of the semantics given above. Let us consider two rabbits named Bugs Bunny and Roger Rabbit. We know about them, that Bugs Bunny is a grey rabbit and if Roger Rabbit is not a grey rabbit, then he is a white one. This information can be understood as a normal logic program:
There is no doubt that Bugs Bunny is grey is true because it is a fact. There is also no doubt that every try to prove that Roger Rabbit is grey will fail. Hence, using the negation-as-failure rule, we can infer that Roger Rabbit is white is also true. But everybody would agree that there is a difference of quality between the two statements because negation-as-failure is not a sound inference rule. The approach of [3] suggests that the ground atom grey(Bugs Bunny) receives the best possible truth value named T 0 because it is a fact of the program. The atom grey(Roger Rabbit) receives the worst possible truth value named F 0 because of the negation-as-failure approach. Hence, using the above semantics for negation, white(Roger Rabbit) receives only the second best truth value T 1 .
The Immediate Consequence Operator
Definition 18. Let P be a program, then the immediate consequence operator T P for the program P is a mapping from and into {I; I is an interpretation}, where T P (I) maps an A ∈ H B to T P (I)(A) := sup{ φ I ; A ← φ ∈ P G }. (Notice that P G can be infinite and hence we cannot use max instead of sup.)
Definition 19. Let α be an arbitrary countable ordinal. A function T from and into the set of interpretations is called α-monotonic iff for all interpretations I and J the property
We will show that T P is α-monotonic. Before we will give the proof of this property, we have to prove the first extension theorem.
Theorem 1 (Extension Theorem I). Let α be an arbitrary countable ordinal and I, J two interpretations provided that I ⊑ α J. The following properties hold for every formula φ:
Proof. We show these statements by induction on φ. Let I H (X) be an abbreviation for 1. and 2. and 3., where φ is replaced by X (induction hypothesis). Case 1: φ = ⊤ or φ =⊥. In this case 1., 2., and 3. are obviously true. Case 2: φ = P k (t 1 , ..., t s k ). 1., 2., and 3. follow directly from I ⊑ α J. Case 3: φ = ¬(A). We assume that I H (A). We show simultaneously that 1., 2. and 3. also hold. Therefore, we choose an assignment h and a truth value w such that F 0 ≤ w ≤ F α resp.
h . Finally, using Definition 15, we get that φ
Before we can go on with the next case, we must prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 2. We use the same assumptions as in Theorem 1. Let I be a set of indices, A i (i ∈ I) a formula provided that I H (A i ) and h i (i ∈ I) an assignment. We define inf K := inf{ A i K hi ; i ∈ I} and sup K := sup{ A i K hi ; i ∈ I} (where K = I, J). Then the following holds:
Proof. 1.: Assume that inf J = F γ . Using Lemma 1 we get that there exists an i 0 such that A i0
hi for all i ∈ I. (Since otherwise we had that there exists a j 0 ∈ I such that A j0
Then, using the third part of I H (A j0 ), it would also be A j0 J hj 0 < F γ . But this contradicts our assumption inf J = F γ .) Finally, we get that inf I = F γ .
2.: Assume now, that inf
3.: Due to 1. and 2., it only remains to show (inf J = T γ ⇒ inf I = T γ ) and
hi for all i ∈ I and this implies, using the third part of
hi for all i. Finally, we get that inf I = T γ . For the latter case assume that inf I = F γ (γ < α). Then there exists an i 0 such that A i0
. Then, using the third part of I H (A i0 ), we get that A i0
(Since otherwise we had that there exists a j 0 ∈ I such that A j0 I hj 0 < F γ , see proof of statement 1.) Finally, we get that inf J = F γ . We will not give the proofs of 4., 5., and 6. here, because they are similar to 1., 2., and 3..
Assume that I H (A) and I H (B). Let h be an arbitrary assumption. We define I := {1, 2},
Then, using 1., 2. and 3. of Lemma 2, we get that 1., 2. and 3. of Theorem 1 hold.
Replace min by max and inf by sup in the proof above and use 4., 5. and 6. of Lemma 2 instead of 1., 2. and 3.. Case 6: φ = ∀v(A). Assume that I H (A) and let h be an arbitrary assumption.
Then, using 1., 2. and 3. of Lemma 2, we get that 1., 2. and 3. of Theorem 1 hold. Case 7: φ = ∃v(A). Replace inf by sup in the proof above and use 4., 5. and 6. of Lemma 2 instead of 1., 2. and 3.. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 3. The immediate consequence operator T P of a given program P is α-monotonic for all countable ordinals α.
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction on α. Assume the lemma holds for all β < α (induction hypothesis). We demonstrate that it also holds for α. Let I, J be two interpretations such that I ⊑ α J. Then, using the induction hypothesis, we get that
It remains to show that
For the first statement assume that T P (I)(A) = T α for some A ∈ H B . Then, using Lemma 1, there exists a ground instance A ← φ of P such that φ I = T α . But then, by Theorem 1, φ J = T α . This implies T α ≤ T P (J)(A). But this implies T α = T P (J)(A). (Since T α < T P (J)(A), using (1), would imply T α < T P (I)(A).) For the latter statement assume that T P (J)(A) = F α for some A ∈ H B . This implies that φ J ≤ F α for every ground instance A ← φ of P . But then, using again Theorem 1, we get that φ I = φ J for every ground instance A → φ of P . Finally, this implies also T P (I)(A) = F α .
⊓ ⊔ Remark 3. The immediate consequence operator T P is not monotonic with respect to ⊑ ∞ . Consider the program P = {A ← ¬A} and the interpretations I 1 and I 2 given by I 1 := {A → F 0 } and I 2 := {A → 0}. Obviously, I 1 ⊏ 0 I 2 and hence I 1 ⊑ ∞ I 2 . Using Definition 18, we get that
In this section we show how to construct the interpretation M P of a given formula-based logic program P . We will give the proof that M P is a model of P and that it is the least of all models of P in the next section. In [3] the authors give a clear informal description of the following construction: "As a first approximation to M P , we start (...) iterating the T P on ∅ until both the set of atoms that have a F 0 value and the set of atoms having T 0 value, stabilize. We keep all these atoms whose values have stabilized and reset the values of all remaining atoms to the next false value (namely F 1 ). The procedure is repeated until the F 1 and T 1 values stabilize, and we reset the remaining atoms to a value equal to F 2 , and so on. Since the Herbrand Base of P is countable, there exists a countable ordinal δ for which this process will not produce any new atoms having F δ or T δ values. At this point we stop iteration and reset all remaining atoms to the value 0." Definition 20. Let P be a program, I an interpretation, and α ∈ ℵ 1 such that I ⊑ α T P (I). We define by recursion on the ordinal β ∈ Ω the interpretation T 
Lemma 4. Let P be a program, I an interpretation and α ∈ ℵ 1 such that I ⊑ α T P (I). Then the following holds:
1. For all limit ordinals 0 < γ ∈ Ω and all interpretations M the condition ∀β < γ :
Proof. 1.: The proof follows directly from the above definition. 2.: One can prove the second statement with induction, using the assumption I ⊑ α T P (I), the fact that T P is α-monotonic, the fact that ⊑ α is transitive and at limit stage the first statement of this lemma.
⊓ ⊔
At this point, we have to consider a theorem of Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC). In the case of normal logic programs this theorem is not necessary, because in the bodies of normal logic programs do not appear "∀" or "∃". One can find the proof of the theorem in [1] .
Definition 21. Let α > 0 be a limit ordinal. We say that an increasing β-sequence (α ζ ) ζ<β , β limit ordinal, is cofinal in α if sup{α ζ ; ζ < β} = α. Similarly, A ⊆ α is cofinal in α if supA = α. If α is an infinite limit ordinal, the cofinality of α is cf (α) = "the least limit ordinal β such that there is an increasing β-sequence (α ζ ) ζ<β with sup{α ζ ; ζ < β} = α". An infinite cardinal ℵ α is regular if cf (ℵ α ) = ℵ α .
Theorem 2. Every cardinal of the form ℵ α+1 is regular. Particularly, ℵ 1 is regular.
Theorem 3 (Extension Theorem II). Let P be a program, I an interpretation, and α ∈ ℵ 1 such that I ⊑ α T P (I). Then for every formula φ ∈ Form and every assignment h the following hold:
and not (C2) and not (C3)
Proof. 1. and 2.: We get this using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1.
3.:
We show this by induction on φ. We define I i := T i P,α (I) and I ∞ := T ℵ1 P,α (I). Moreover, we use I H (X) as an abbreviation for "for all assignments g the property ∀i ∈ ℵ 1 ( X
The following cases are more general than this case. Therefore, we will not give a proof here. Case 4: φ = ∃v(A). We assume that I H (A) and for every i ∈ ℵ 1 we assume that φ 
has the properties ∀i ∈ ℵ 1 : ζ(u i ) > i and sup{ζ(u i ); i ∈ ℵ 1 } = ℵ 1 . We assume now that
is a countable subset of ℵ 1 and moreover cofinal in ℵ 1 . But this is a contradiction to Theorem 2. Therefore we know that there exists an atom 
This implies φ

4.:"⇒":
We prove this by the method of contrapositive. We assume that (C1) or (C2) or (C3). Then, using 1., 2., and 3., we get that not(F α < φ I∞ h < T α ) holds. "⇐": We shall first consider the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 3 for every formula φ ∈ Form and every assignment h the following hold:
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 statement 3. (see Appendix).
⊓ ⊔
We prove "⇐" also by the method of contrapositive. We assume that F α < φ consider the first case (resp. the second case). Then, using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, (C1) (resp. (C3)) holds. Now, we consider the latter case. Using Lemma 5 we get that (C2) holds. Finally, in every case (C1) or (C2) or (C3) holds.
⊓ ⊔ Definition 22. Let α be a countable ordinal and for every γ < α let I γ be an interpretation such that ∀ζ ≤ γ : I ζ = ζ I γ . Then the union of the interpretations I γ (γ < α) is a well-defined interpretation and given by the following definition:
Remark 4. Using ∀ζ ≤ γ : I ζ = ζ I γ it is easy to prove that the union γ<α I γ is a well-defined interpretation. Particularly if α = 0, then the union is equal to the interpretation that maps all atoms of H B to the truth value F 0 . This interpretation is sometimes denoted by ∅.
Lemma 6. Let P be a program, α be a countable ordinal and for all γ < α an interpretation I γ is given such that ∀ζ < γ : I ζ = ζ I γ . Then the following holds:
Proof. We assume that
First, we prove that ∀β < α : γ<α I γ = β T P ( γ<α I γ ). For all β < α we know that I β = β γ<α I γ . Then, using Lemma 3, ∀β < α : T P (I β ) = β T P ( γ<α I γ ). This implies for all β < α the property γ<α I γ = β I β = (2) β T P (I β ) = β T P ( γ<α I γ ). We know that γ<α I γ does not map to truth values w such that F α < w ≤ T α . And this obviously implies γ<α I γ ⊑ α T P ( γ<α I γ ). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 7. Let P be a program, α a countable ordinal, and I an interpretation. Then the following holds:
Proof. Again, we define I i := T i P,α (I), I ∞ := T ℵ1 P,α (I). Let us assume that I ⊑ α T P (I). First we prove I ∞ ⊑ α T P (I ∞ ). Using Lemma 4 we get that ∀γ < ℵ 1 : I γ ⊑ α I ∞ . Then, using Lemma 3, γ ∈ ℵ 1 : I γ+1 ⊑ α T P (I ∞ ). Using again Lemma 4 and the transitivity of ⊑ α we get that ∀γ < ℵ 1 : I γ ⊑ α T P (I ∞ ). Then, using the first part of Lemma 4, I ∞ ⊑ α T P (I ∞ ). Let us prove now T P (I ∞ ) ⊑ α I ∞ . It remains to show
as well as
Firstly, let us prove that (3) holds and therefore we assume that I ∞ (A) = F α for some A ∈ H B . Then, using the definition of I ∞ , we get that for all i ∈ ℵ 1 the following holds:
Let A ← φ be an arbitrary ground instance of P . We prove now that the property φ I∞ = φ I holds. Then, using (5) and the definition of the immediate consequence operator T P , we get that F α = I 1 (A) = sup{ C I ; A ← C ∈ P G }. This implies either φ I < F α or φ I = F α . We consider the first case. Then, using Theorem 3, we get that φ I∞ = φ I . In the latter case, using again (5), we get that for all i ∈ ℵ 1 the property F α = I i+1 (A) = sup{ C Ii ; A ← C ∈ P G } holds. This obviously implies ∀i ∈ ℵ 1 : φ Ii ≤ F α . Then, using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we get that ∀i ∈ ℵ 1 : φ Ii = F α . But then the third part of Theorem 3 finally implies that φ I∞ = F α = φ I .
Thus the above argumentation implies that for all
. Secondly, let us prove (4) and therefore we assume now that T P (I ∞ )(A) = T α for some A ∈ H B . Then sup{ φ I∞ ; A ← φ ∈ P G } = T α . This and Lemma 1 allow us to choose a ground instance A ← φ such that φ I∞ = T α . Then, using Lemma 5, we can choose an ordinal i 0 ∈ ℵ 1 such that φ Ii 0 = T α . This implies A Ii 0 +1 ≥ T α . We know I i0+1 ⊑ α T P (I ∞ ) by Lemma 4 and Lemma 3. But then, using Theorem 1 and the assumption of this case, A Ii 0 +1 = T α must hold. Finally, using the second part of Theorem 3, we get that I ∞ (A) = T α . The argumentation above implies that I ∞ = α T P (I ∞ ). We know that I ∞ does not map to truth values w such that F α+1 < w ≤ T α+1 . And this obviously implies I ∞ ⊑ α+1 T P (I ∞ ).
⊓ ⊔ Definition 23. Let P be a program. We define by recursion on the countable ordinal α the approximant M α of P as follows:
Theorem 4. Let P be a program, then for all α ∈ ℵ 1 the following holds:
Proof. We prove this by induction on α. We assume that the theorem holds for all β < α (induction hypothesis). We prove that it holds also for α. Using the induction hypothesis, we get that for every β < α the following properties hold ∀γ < β : M γ = γ M β as well as M β ⊑ β+1 T P (M β ). Then, using Lemma 6, we get that γ<α M γ ⊑ α T P ( γ<α M γ ) (this is 2.). This together with the above definition imply M α = T ℵ1 P,α ( γ<α M γ ) (this is 3.). Then, using 2. and 3. and Lemma 7, we get that M α ⊑ α+1 T P (M α ) (this is 4.). It remains to prove the first statement. We know that for all γ < α the property
M α holds. Then, using that ⊑ α is stronger than = γ , we get that 1. also holds.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 8. Let P be a program. Then there exists an ordinal δ ∈ ℵ 1 such that
Proof. We define the subset H * B of the Herbrand base H B by H * B := {A ∈ H B ; ∃γ ∈ ℵ 1 : M γ (A) ∈ {F γ , T γ }}. Then, using part one of Theorem 4, we know that for every A ∈ H * B there is exactly one γ A such that M γA (A) ∈ {F γA , T γA }. Now let us define the function ζ by ζ : H * B → ℵ 1 : A → γ A . We know that H * B is countable. This implies that ζ(H * B ) is also countable. Then, using Theorem 2, we know that ζ(H * B ) is not cofinal in ℵ 1 . This obviously implies that there is an ordinal δ ∈ ℵ 1 such that ∀A ∈ H * B : ζ(A) < δ. Finally, this ordinal δ satisfies the property (6).
⊓ ⊔ Definition 24. Let P be a program. The lemma above justifies the definition δ P := min{δ; ∀γ ≥ δ : M γ F γ = ∅ and M γ T γ = ∅} ∈ ℵ 1 . This ordinal δ P is called the depth of the program P .
Definition 25. We define the interpretation M P of a given formula-based logic program P by
Proof. See Theorem 7.1 in [3] . ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 5. Let P be a program. The interpretation M P is a model of P .
Proof. See Theorem 7.2 in [3] . ⊓ ⊔ Proposition 2. Let P be a program, α a countable ordinal and M an arbitrary model of P . Then the following holds:
Now we prove that the following holds:
Using Lemma 3 and the assumption above, we get that ∀β < α (T P (M β ) = β T P (M )). This the assumption above and the fourth part of Theorem 4 imply that ∀β < α : M = β T P (M ). But this, together with with the fact that M is a model (i.e., M (A) ≥ T P (M )(A) holds for all atoms A ∈ H U ), implies that (8) holds. We finish the proof by induction on the ordinal γ ∈ Ω. Using Lemma 3 and (8), we get that
Using the first part of Lemma 4, we get for every limit ordinal γ that ∀β < γ :
Then, using (7) and statement 3. of Theorem 4,
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 6. The interpretation M P of a given program P is the least of all models of P (i.e., for all models M of P the property M P ⊑ ∞ M holds).
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary model of P . Without loss of generality, we assume that M = M P . Then let α be the least ordinal such that ∀β < α (M P = β M ). This implies also ∀β < α (M β = β M ). Then, using Proposition 2,
Proof. It is easy to prove that every fixed point of T P is also a model of P . This together with Proposition 1 and Theorem 6 imply Corollary 1.
There is a countable ordinal δ ∈ ℵ 1 such that for all programs P of an arbitrary language L n,m,l,(si),(ri) the property δ P < δ holds. Let δ max be the least ordinal such that the above property holds.
Proof. We know that the set of all signatures n, m, l, (s i ) 1≤i≤n , (r i ) 1≤i≤m is countable. Additionally, we know that the set of all programs of a fixed signature is also countable (Remember that a program is a finite set of rules.). This implies that the set of all programs is countable. Then we get that the image of the function from the set of all programs to ℵ 1 given by P → δ P is countable. Then, using Theorem 2, the image of δ (·) is not cofinal in ℵ 1 (i.e., there exists an ordinal δ ∈ ℵ 1 such that for all programs P the property δ P < δ holds).
Proof. Let n > 0 be a natural number. We consider the program P n consisting of the following rules (where G, H are predicate symbols, f is a function symbol and c is a constant):
This implies that M Pn maps G f k1 (c), ..., f kn (c) to F n−1 m=1 kmω n−m +kn·2 and H to F ω n .
⊓ ⊔
At the end of this paper we will prove that the 3-valued interpretation M P,3 that results from the infinite-valued model M P by collapsing all true values to True (abbr. T ) and all false values to False (abbr. F ) is also a model in the sense of the following semantics: 
Definition 26. The semantics of formulas with respect to 3-valued interpretations is defined as in Definition 15 except that
Then, using the assumption, we get that ψ ; u ∈ H U } = 0. We know that H U is a countable set and hence, using Theorem 2, we get that there must be an u ′ ∈ H U such that ψ Proof. We assume that A ← φ is a rule of P . Then, for every assignment h, we get that
holds.
⊓ ⊔
Proof. Let N 3 be an arbitrary 3-valued model of the program P , such that N 3 is smaller or equal to M 3 . This is equivalent to
Now we have to prove that N 3 is equal to M P,3 . Note that this holds if and only if both equations M P,3 F = N 3 F and N 3 T = M P,3 T hold. Firstly, we prove that N 3 T = M P,3 T by contradiction. We assume that
We know that M P,3 T = α∈ℵ1 M P T α and hence, using (11), there must be at least one ordinal
To improve readability we define J := β<αmin M β . It is obviously that α min < δ P , and hence Definition 25, Theorem 4, and Definition 20 imply
This and the definition of α min justify the definition γ min := min{γ ∈ ℵ 1 ; T γ P,αmin (J) T αmin \N 3 T = ∅}. From Definition 22 and Definition 20 we infer that 0 < γ min and γ min is not an infinite limit ordinal, hence γ min is a successor ordinal. We assume that γ min = γ − min + 1. Then, using the definition of α min and γ min , we get that T γmin−1 P,αmin (J) T ζ ⊆ N 3 T for all ζ ≤ α min . Using statement (10) we infer that T γmin−1 P,αmin (J) F ζ ⊆ N 3 F for all ζ < α min . Hence, the following definition of the infinite-valued interpretation N is well-defined.
It is easy to see that
Since T γmin P,αmin (J) T αmin \ N 3 T is not empty, we can pick an A that is contained in this set. Then, together with Definition 18, we get that T αmin = T γmin P,αmin (J)(A) = T P (T γmin−1 P,αmin (J))(A) = sup{ φ I ; A ← φ ∈ P G }, where I := T γmin−1 P,αmin (J). Hence, using Lemma 1, we can pick a rule A ← φ ∈ P G such that φ I = T αmin . Then, using statement (12), Theorem 1, and Proposition 5, we get that φ N = T αmin and φ N3 = φ collapse(N ) = collapse( φ N ) = T . Lastly, the fact that N 3 is a model and A ← φ is a ground instance of P imply that N 3 (A) = T . But this is a contradiction because we have chosen A to be not contained in N 3 T . Hence, statement (11) must be wrong (i.e., M P,3 T = N 3 T ). Secondly, we show that M P,3 F = N 3 F . Definition 25 implies that M P,3 F = ζ<δP M δP F ζ and M P,3 T = ζ<δP M δP T ζ . Then, using (10) and the result of the first part of this proof, we get that ζ<δP M δP F ζ ⊆ N 3 F and ζ<δP M δP T ζ = N 3 T . Hence, the following definition of the infinite-valued interpretation N is well-defined and N 3 = collapse(N ).
Now we are going to prove by transfinite induction on ζ ∈ ℵ 1 that T
The Definition of N , Definition 24, and Theorem
Case 1: ζ = 0. It is easy to prove (using Theorem 4, the result of the first part of this proof, and
Case 2: ζ is a successor ordinal and T ζ−1 P,δP +1 (M δP ) ⊑ δP +1 N . Then, using Definition 20 and Lemma 4, we get that T P (T ζ−1 P,δP +1 (M δP )) = T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP )
and
We will prove that T ζ−1 P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 \ T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δp+1 and N F δP +1 are disjoint. This, using T ζ−1 P,δP +1 (M δP ) ⊑ δP +1 N and statement (14), implies that N F δP +1 ⊆ T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 and we have proved this case. Therefore, we choose an arbitrary A ∈ T ζ−1 P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 \ T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δp+1 . Hence, using Lemma 4, we get that F δP +1 < T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP )(A). This, together with (13) and Definition 18, implies that there must be a rule A ← φ ∈ P G such that F δP +1 < φ I , where I is given by I := T ζ−1 P,δP +1 (M δP ). Then, using the assumption I ⊑ δP +1 N and Theorem 1, we get that F δP +1 < φ N . We know that for all atoms C ∈ H B the image N (C) is an element of [F 0 , F δP +1 ] ∪ {0} ∪ [T δP , T 0 ]. Then Lemma 9 and the fact that deg ¬ (φ) ≤ 1 imply 0 ≤ φ N . Hence, using Proposition 5, N 3 = collapse(N ) and N 3 is a model of P , we get that 0 ≤ φ N3 ≤ N 3 (A). Finally, this implies A / ∈ N 3 F ⊇ N 3 F \ M P,3 F = N F δp+1 . Case 3: ζ > 0 is a limit ordinal and T γ P,δP +1 (M δP ) ⊑ δP +1 N for all γ < ζ. This implies N F δP +1 ⊆ T γ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 for all γ < ζ. Hence, using Definition 20, we get that T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 = γ∈ζ T γ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 ⊇ N F δP +1 . The above transfinite induction shows that N F δP +1 ⊆ ζ∈ℵ1 T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 . Then, using that M δP +1 F δP +1 = ∅ and M δP +1 F δP +1 = ζ∈ℵ1 T ζ P,δP +1 (M δP ) F δP +1 , we get that ∅ = N F δP +1 = N 3 F \ M P,3 F (see definition of N above). Last of all, using the assumption (10), we get that M P,3 F = N 3 F . ⊓ ⊔
Summary and Future Work
We have shown that every formula-based logic program P has a least infinite-valued model M P with respect to the ordering ⊑ ∞ given on the set of all infinite-valued interpretations. We have presented how to construct the model M P with the help of the immediate consequence operator T P and have shown that M P is also the least of all fixed points of the operator T P . Moreover, we have considered the 3-valued interpretation M P, 3 and have proven that it is a 3-valued model of the program P . Furthermore, we have observed a restricted class of formula-based programs such that the associated 3-valued models are even minimal models. There are some aspects of this paper that we feel should be further investigated. Firstly, we believe that the main results of this work also hold in Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic set theory without the Axiom of Choice (ZF). For instance, we could use the class of all ordinals Ω instead of the cardinal ℵ 1 in Theorem 3. Secondly, we have proven that the ordinal δ max is at least ω ω , but on the other hand we do not know a program P such that ω ω < δ P . So, one could assume that δ max = ω ω . Thirdly, the negation-as-failure rule is sound for M P (respectively, M P,3 ) when we are dealing with a normal program P . Within the context of formula-based programs we think it would be fruitful to investigate the rule of definitional reflection presented in [4] instead of negation-asfailure. Lastly, we believe that the presented theory can be useful in the areas of databases and data mining. We are looking forward to collaborate with research groups specializing in these areas.
